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As opposed to the conventional type of asset exploitation-based foreign direct investment (FDI), 
this paper illustrates why firms invest abroad based on Moon and Roehl’s (2001) imbalance theory. 
Firms invest to complement their disadvantages and enhance their position in international business. 
Thus, by extending the imbalance theory, this paper shifts our focus on sources of competitiveness from 
monopolistic asset to complementing capability for firms’ disadvantages. The complementary 
capability can be categorized into four, which are agility, benchmarking, convergence and dedication. 
Based on the perspectives of both exploiting advantages and complementing disadvantages, this paper 
re-categorizes FDI motivations to factor seeking, demand seeking, related-and-supporting-sector 
seeking and business context seeking. 
 






Dunning’s OLI paradigm was developed based on firms from developed countries and 
those that have proprietary assets over other competitors in host countries. However, his 
theory has limitations in explaining the upward investment trend of new multinational 
corporations (MNCs) from developing countries as they do not possess any specific firm 
advantages compared to the leading firms in developed countries. In order to better explain 
the new trend, Moon and Roehl (2001) introduced the imbalance theory which explains firms’ 
internationalization path from the perspectives of firms from both developing and developed 
countries. Firms invest abroad not only to exploit their competitive assets, but also to 
complement their critical disadvantages.  
Although the imbalance theory was developed to explain unconventional FDI based on 
the imbalances of firm’s asset portfolio, this theory can be applied to the entire value chain 
activities of the firm (Yim, 2013). Firms face continuous disruptions in their value chain and 
they grow through complementing any disadvantages. The imbalance theory can also be 
applied to host country’s perspective in explaining why governments try to attract FDI 
despite some of the problems that can come from MNCs’ presence in their countries.  
Firms from developing countries do not have superior ownership advantages, but they 
may have complementing capabilities to overcome their critical disadvantages. Their 
advantages can be drawn from Moon (2013; 2014) who explained the critical success factors 
of latecomers in the industry. These advantages have become very crucial in rapidly 
changing environments as firms’ prosperity has become a matter of adaptation to changing 
environments than developing a superior resource. Here, we extend the original underlying 
assumption of the imbalance theory and emphasize that firms from developing countries 
have “different” types of ownership advantages from the conventional perspective.  
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With increasing FDI flows from emerging economies, FDI motivations have become 
more diverse than market-seeking, resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking and strategic-asset-
seeking. Thus, while extending Dunning’s FDI motivations, this paper categorizes them from 
both the conventional (OLI paradigm) and the new perspectives (the imbalance theory). By 
reorganizing some of the examples and methodologies set by Moon (2007), this paper 
presents four FDI motivations that are factor-driven, market-driven, related and support 
industries-driven and business context-driven.  
This paper is organized as follows. First, this paper illustrates the theoretical development 
from Dunning’s OLI paradigm, the backbone of the FDI theories, to an extended logic of the 
imbalance theory. Second, this paper demonstrates how we can reconcile the most 
conflicting aspect between the OLI paradigm and the imbalance theory by reinterpreting the 
ownership advantages of the firm. Third, this paper illustrates four motivations of firms from 
both the conventional and the new perspectives by presenting real world case studies.  
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW: FROM OLI PARADIGM TO IMBALANCE THEORY 
 
The studies on FDI have burgeoned based on the investment development paths. As 
countries become more industrialized or developed, their firms also build up their 
competencies. This is why MNCs from developed countries have more advanced assets than 
those from developing countries. Earlier studies of FDI thus are based on the MNCs from 
developed nations that have advantages over firms in host countries, mostly in developing 
countries. MNCs generate rents from exploiting their advantages and building monopolistic 
status in foreign countries. 
This perspective was developed into the OLI paradigm by John Dunning, which became 
the backbone of FDI theories. The tripods of the OLI paradigm represent ownership 
advantage, location advantage, and internalization advantage. When firms invest abroad, 
they are put in a relatively disadvantageous position compared to the local firms in the host 
country because of the unfamiliarity with the host country’s business environment. This 
requires the investing firm to have a superior firm-specific advantage (ownership advantage) 
that can outweigh disadvantages of doing business abroad. Thus Dunning’s theory was 
developed to stress the exploitation of ownership advantages prior to location and 
internalization advantages.  
However, MNCs from developing countries take on different features from those of 
developed firms. First, they do not have the critical advantages that outweigh the liability of 
foreignness, particularly when they invest in more developed regions. Second, despite their 
disadvantageous positions, firms from developing countries invest both in developing and 
developed countries. Thus, in later years, even though Dunning and subsequent scholars 
distinguished asset augmentation type from asset exploitation type of FDI, building firm 
advantages from scratch in a foreign location was not explainable and contradicted with the 
underlying logic of the OLI paradigm (Moon, 2004a; 2004b). 
In order to better explain both features of upward and downward investments, Moon and 
Roehl (2001) contended the underlying assumption of the OLI paradigm, by arguing that 
firms without ownership advantages can also invest abroad, and presented the “imbalance 
theory”. As opposed to the conventional perspective on rent yielding FDI, Moon and Roehl 
(2001) insisted that the motivations of outward FDI from developing countries are not to 
exploit the existing resources but to complement what they lack at the current status.  
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The imbalance theory is found in Penrose’s (1959) idea on “the imbalance in firm 
resource portfolio”. Although Penrose (1959) herself did not pay much attention to FDI, 
Moon and Roehl (2001) explained that any affluence or deficiency of resources will motivate 
firms to go abroad in order to maintain the “balance” between the optimal level of output 
versus input. Firms with ownership advantage will go abroad to exploit their competitive and 
abundant resources (Moon, 2004a; 2004b) and those with critical disadvantages will also 
venture abroad to complement their shortage in resources such as technology, brands, 
distribution networks and market position.  
Taking an example of two MNCs from Korea, Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. (SEC) and 
LG Electronics (LGE), SEC had a larger market share than LGE in the domestic market by 
having competitive assets in semiconductor business. If we were to analyze this case from 
the conventional perspective of FDI, because SEC had relatively a stronger position at home, 
it is likely to invest abroad more than LGE. However, Moon and Roehl (2001) found that 
LGE invested more than SEC in Silicon Valley. LGE was more active in foreign investment 
in order to compensate for its disadvantageous position at home and not to lose its 
technological and market position against SEC.  
Some may argue that this can be explained by the “location advantage” of the OLI 
paradigm. Firms invest in Silicon Valley to exploit technology-related location advantages. 
Yet the OLI paradigm assumes that the condition of having a superior ownership advantage 
has to be met before looking for location advantages. Even asset-augmentation perspective 
can only explain up to the point why both firms invested in Silicon Valley, but cannot 
explain why LGE invested more than SEC in Silicon Valley.  
With regard to the country-of-origin effects, the imbalance theory also illustrates why 
MNCs choose to go abroad beyond the motivations of asset, market, efficiency or strategic 
asset seeking, presented by Dunning (1997; 1998; 2000). MNCs from less developed nations 
are perceived to be “inferior” regardless of their actual competencies as consumers reflect the 
image of a country on products (Bilkey and Nes, 1982). Whereas consumers, particularly in 
developed countries, are likely to show more favorable attitudes towards domestic rather 
than foreign products, studies have shown that there exists hierarchy of psychic effects 
among countries (e.g., Han and Terpstra, 1988). Simply put, products – made in, sourced 
from or branded by developing countries—will be less favored than the products from 
developed countries. The customers tend to evaluate them negatively than their actual quality 
and associate it with their psychic distance.  
General explanation of this behavior is that the consumers are less informed and less 
familiar with foreign products (Han and Terpstra, 1988). In order to overcome the 
disadvantages of home country image, firms from developing countries increase their 
investments abroad in more developed countries to establish a good brand name. This was 
the case of the Korean firms in the past, where they tried to demarcate their country from 
their firm image; Korean firms did not emphasize their country-of-origin, rather portrayed 
themselves as “countryless”. 
 
 
3. RE-INTERPRETATION OF IMBALANCE THEORY 
 
Firm’s motivation of going abroad stretches far beyond the exploitation of its own 
resources. Although Dunning (1993; 2000) himself has incorporated the concept of asset 
augmentation in his OLI paradigm, the imbalance theory takes a more proactive approach of 
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exploring new foreign sources which are critically lacking in maximizing the firm 
competitiveness. In this respect, the imbalance theory is meaningful in several ways. First, it 
embraces the concept of dynamic perspective on a firm’s resource exploitation and 
exploration process. Firms with ownership advantage will go abroad when they have 
significant ownership advantages. Firms will also venture abroad to complement their 
shortages in resources. Any imbalances created in firm’s growth will thus constantly 
motivate firms to invest abroad. 
In this respect, the imbalance theory gives insights to why firms need to constantly 
upgrade and complement their assets. Once firms take monopolistic position, they tend to fall 
into competency traps (Leonard-Barton, 1992) or success syndrome (Tushman and O’Reilly, 
1996) as they are likely to continue focusing on what they have been good at. On the other 
hand, when firms fail, they tend to change their businesses or investments without giving 
enough concentration of resources and efforts to make them work.  
Yet, any competitive resources can lose value at any time. Firms’ growth is a matter of 
how firms can exploit their competitive assets but at the same time complement what they 
are critically lacking in order to respond to industry changes. This aligns with the logic set 
out by March (1991) in finding balances between exploitation and exploration. Exploitation 
is about increasing efficiency, control and certainty through refining firms’ resources. 
Exploration is about innovation, autonomy and embracing variations through searching and 
discovering new resources and knowledge. March (1991) explained that it is important to 
maintain a balance between the two in order to stimulate learning capability of the 
organization. Many subsequent studies have been conducted in search of ambidexterity of 
the firm, being capable of doing both things at the same time, or in time series (e.g., Raisch, 
Birkinshaw and Probst, 2009; He and Wong, 2004; Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009). The 
balancing activity not only promotes firms to proactively shape business activities but also 
provides sources to constantly build new competencies of the firm through stimulating 
learning and innovation capabilities of the firm.  
Moreover, the imbalance theory is useful in explaining why some firms show similar FDI 
strategies. A similar explanation from prior studies is based on the oligopolistic reaction to 
competitors’ investment (e.g., Knickerbocker, 1973). Because they have to compete against 
their rivals, they invest in similar resources abroad or preoccupy before others. So if one 
competitor invests in another country, the other has to do the same. Yet, this explanation is 
based on the leading firms or firms from developed countries. It does not compare why the 
late-movers or the followers in the industry can take similar paths with the (leading) firms 
that may have different advantages. The imbalance theory, focusing on the disadvantages of 
the firm, embraces why the followers in the industry (not only necessarily from developing 
countries) take similar routes in FDI as the leaders do—to emulate the leaders by acquiring 
similar resources in which they critically lack at the current status. During the 1990s, Korean 
firms showed similar geographical portfolio of FDI as the Japanese firms did in the past. 
They were able to rapidly catch-up Japanese firms in terms of market share and sales.  
On the other hand, the imbalance theory applies similarly to the host country’s strategy of 
attracting FDI. Whereas location advantages were only assessed from the investing firms’ 
perspective, Yim (2013) explained why some countries need to attract MNCs despite the 
negative impacts coming from MNCs’ presence. Because developing countries have some 
critical disadvantages in their locations, host governments need to bring in MNCs to solve 
these problems which are the barriers to enhancing their competitiveness. The MNCs are 
indeed the most effective driver of changing and upgrading industry structures. 
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The home country image as a less developed country will also drive a critical motivation 
for firms from developing countries to invest in developed countries. Other home 
disadvantages include difficult institutional environment and inefficient or missing market 
mechanisms (Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998; Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008). Whereas 
conventional FDI studies do not explicitly incorporate home disadvantages for FDI, the 
imbalance theory expands our view on FDI motivations and the role of disadvantages on 
firms and countries.  
Although the imbalance theory was mainly developed based on the imbalances in the 
“portfolio” of firm resources and strategic assets, this perspective can be applied and 
extended to the “entire value chain” of firm operations (Yim, 2013). If there are imbalances 
in performances of firm operations, throughout the time, and among the businesses and 
subsidiaries, they can critically hurt the entire operation of the firm. Some businesses evolve 
faster or slower than others. Particularly, technology-oriented firms that have been 
intensively investing in R&D face difficulties in producing them, as the manufacturing 
subsidiaries are not well-informed or cannot catch-up the recent technological development. 
They may need to train workers to produce the upgraded version of the product, or invest 
largely in machines and facilities to produce them which become a big obstruct in fast 
changing environments.  
This was the case for a Korean automaker, Hyundai Motors. To overcome such obstacles, 
Hyundai Motors held seminars and training across all subsidiaries annually to overcome 
imbalances in knowledge level. Trust building across businesses and subsidiaries helped the 
employees’ exchange and transfer knowledge faster, skipping technical procedures to 
exchange data across departments. Thus, addressing any imbalances in value chain has 
helped the company engage in knowledge sharing more efficiently and effectively across 
regional subsidiaries in which their “routine” of knowledge sharing has become one of their 
competitive assets to firm operation.  
 
 
4. TWO PERSPECTIVES ON OWNERSHIP ADVANTAGES 
 
The core difference between the conventional perspective and the imbalance theory on 
FDI lies in the ownership advantage. The concept of ownership advantage derives from the 
theory of market failure.
1
 Hymer [1976(1960)] described that because there are resources 
that are accessible to only a few firms, they become the sources of monopolistic rent seeking 
behavior of MNCs. Firms try to maximize their monopolistic rents and maintain their 
monopolistic position which makes the market more uncompetitive.  
Dunning, who developed the OLI paradigm based on Hymer’s monopolistic asset 
perspective, claimed that firms need to possess ownership advantages that can overcome any 
cost of foreignness (Dunning, 1958; Dunning and Lundan, 2008). After Dunning 
acknowledged the difference between structural market failure and transaction-cost market 
                                                          
1 Prior studies of neo-classical theories assume perfect resources accessibility and no resource mobility 
across national borders, yet FDI theories are based on imperfect market system where factor mobility 
is possible across national borders. Hymer contributed largely by incorporating this in his doctoral 
dissertation in 1960 which was published in 1976, describing market failure, mainly focused on 
structural market failure. He did not however, explicitly distinguish structural market failure from 
transaction-cost market failure (Dunning and Rugman, 1985).  
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failure, he incorporated it under the ownership advantage and extended it to internalization 
advantage. This is why the OLI paradigm was later criticized for the three tripods being not 
mutually exclusive.  
Monopolistic assets help firms take the leading position by raising entry barriers in the 
market, which are interpreted under the context of “superior resources” vis-à-vis rivals in 
which superior resources were described as knowledge-intensive technological or 
organizational resources. However, as opposed to the concept of superiority, the Penrosian 
approach focused on the balanced sequence of resource development, use, acquisition and 
absorption (Rugman and Verbeke, 2002). This is why Moon and Roehl (2001) explained that 
firms from developing countries do not have substantial ownership advantages, meaning that 
these firms do not have superior resources vis-à-vis their rivals from developed countries. 
Rather, their capability lies in their balancing activity of any imbalances in asset portfolio, 
which was largely undervalued in the conventional perspective on proprietary assets.  
As the UNCTAD global survey in 2006 reported in the World Investment Report (WIR), 
three-quarters of the competitive advantages of MNCs from developing countries are not 
from conventional perspective of ownership advantages (e.g., superior technology), rather 
they arise from production processes capabilities (35% of responses), networks and 
relationships (28%), or an effective organizational structure (13%). Thus, we can re-interpret 
the concept of ownership advantage and emphasize that the capabilities of the firms from 
developing countries should be regarded as “different” sets of ownership advantages that 
have become more valuable in high velocity environments. This can be easily seen from the 
rising stream of academia in evolutionary perspective of firm resources, including dynamic 
capability, absorptive capacity, combinative capability, and so on.  
The following illustrates capabilities of firms from developing countries which were 
evaluated as secondary or peripheral capabilities to gain competitive advantages. Yet they 
have increasingly become crucial in strategic management and organizational studies in 
general. The global economy is no more as stable as it has been in the past, thus a shift 
towards a dynamic perspective in finding sources of competitive advantages is not only 
confined to a few emerging firms but applies to MNCs in general (e.g., Teece, Pisano and 
Shuen, 1997). These capabilities also better explain how latecomers in the industry can catch 
up and find favorable competitive position in the market.  
 
4.1 Overcoming Capabilities 
 
Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008) found that MNCs from developing nations have better 
operating skills under “difficult” governance conditions of developing countries than those 
from developed countries because they are more familiar with these situations back in home 
country, whereas MNCs from developed countries are not familiar with those situations. 
Developing country MNCs build resilience to difficulties and they know how to work-
around anti-market barriers in doing businesses. For example, firms that come from a 
country with a high corruption are likely to know better than MNCs from developed 
countries in working with corruption and government officials in the host country. The 
World Bank (2005) also reported that MNCs from developing countries have an edge in 
other developing countries as they are culturally similar or they are geographically closer to 
each other. Such familiarity reduces hidden and overhead costs in business operations. 
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4.2 Operational/Execution Capabilities 
 
MNCs from emerging economies have taken different paths in firm evolution from those 
of developed economies. Because underdeveloped countries have no well-institutionalized 
infrastructure and high market imperfection, firms have diversified into multiple businesses 
to expropriate rents that are coming from underdeveloped industries. MNCs grew out of the 
ability to set up new business ventures across a variety of industries quickly and at a low cost 
(Guillen, 2000). Through such experiences, these firms have built competencies in 
effectively setting up subsidiaries abroad and repeatedly entering a variety of industries 
(Amsden and Hikino, 1994).  
Thus, they share resources across subsidiaries and firms which can help them build the 
overall and diverse knowledge over various projects, operations and businesses. For example, 
because there were not many skilled managers in Korea, the top management team members 
were circulated across various subsidiaries upon their start-up and built diverse networks 
within the firm. This was how Samsung Group, the Korean conglomerate was able to 
effectively diversify and establish new subsidiaries due to the project execution capabilities 
of the managers (Amsden and Hikino, 1994). Overall, we can see that the cost per unit of 
subsidiary incorporation reduces with an increase in experiences. This has helped the firm 
have portfolio of expertise for constant upgrade and expansion of the firm.  
 
4.3 Networking Capabilities 
 
A strong network-building of firms has become a competitive source for latecomers (Yiu, 
Law and Bruton, 2007). Because these MNCs are conglomerates that have diversified into 
various industries, they share important information and experience from peer members who 
have undertaken international expansion. They are also vertically integrated and form a 
strong relationship with international suppliers and clients. This helps the investing firms 
enhance the bargaining power of the entire business network over the host country 
government and establish market legitimacy in the local markets (Yiu et al., 2007).  
Moreover, firms gain precious information from other institutions at home where they 
have built close relationships. Guillen and Garcia-Canal (2009) specified that they have 
better political capabilities as they evolve in close connections with the government and 
political institutions. This capability helps firms better understand and deal with different 
situations in host countries than the Western firms that are not familiar with the host country 
environments.  
These capabilities were understood to be unique to successful latecomers in the industry. 
Yet, as the environment has become more volatile, these capabilities have been reorganized 
by Moon (2013; 2014) as new sources of competitive advantage. He implied that they should 
be extended to be applicable to the leading MNCs because the competitive sources do not lie 
in “what” resources but in “how” firms upgrade and manage these resources in the long run.  
 
 
5. RE-INTERPRETATION OF OWNERSHIP ADVANTAGE: COMPLEMENTING 
CAPABILITIES 
 
Firm capabilities from developing countries lie in overcoming disadvantages of both 
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internal and external factors and balancing out any disruptions in business activities through 
time (Moon, 2004b; Moon and Roehl, 2001). These features have become the drivers for 
firms’ growth. While incorporating firm capabilities set out by previous scholars in the 
section above, this paper links latecomer’s competitive advantages set out by Moon (2013; 
2014) with “different” ownership advantages of firms when investing abroad. He 
incorporated some of the missing variables of latecomer’s competitive advantages and 
reorganized them to four which are agility, benchmarking, convergence and dedication.  
Agility comes from speed competitiveness. Agility is required in every activity of the 
value chain and across the value chain. Each operation needs to be speedy and precise and 
each of them has to conform to finding a balance across its value chain activities to maintain 
efficiency. If one value activity grows faster than other activities, the entire outcome will not 
reach its full potential. Agility has particularly become important in fast changing 
environments as an independent source of competitiveness as firm productivity is not only 
constrained by the minimum level of input costs but also with opportunity costs coming from 
lead time.  
Benchmarking capability has not been considered as an aspect of competitiveness. Porter 
(1996) explained that doing things differently from others to deliver a unique value is a 
strategy, whereas enhancing operational effectiveness is not. However, Moon (2013; 2014) 
explained that when firms learn from each other, firms can constantly develop and find 
sources of competitiveness. It is also because today’s international business is so complicated 
and highly interdependent that rather than bringing disruptions to the industry, bringing 
compatible yet complementary assets to existing global standard provides sustainable 
advantages. Thus, by having a high learning competitiveness by emulating the global 
standard, firms can continuously sustain their competitive advantages. 
Convergence is mixing and creating synergistic effects. Whereas the conventional 
perspective on firms from developing countries explains that they are diversified into 
multiple and unrelated businesses, Moon (2013; 2014) reinterpreted that these firms build 
capabilities to converge diversified businesses into one unit which creates synergistic effects. 
He argued that the benefits can in fact outweigh the costs coming from (unrelated) 
diversification as firms build diverse knowledge and experience that can be shared and 
utilized across units. They combine and reconfigure resources for different purposes so that 
businesses can become more resilient to different business contexts.  
Lastly, motivation of workers in firms of developed countries was emphasized by giving 
incentive systems and making workers to aspire for a superior compensation. However, 
motivation in firms of emerging economies, particularly in South Korea, was rather 
stimulated by setting clear goal sets with an emphasis on disadvantageous situation of the 
firm. For example, Hyundai Motors and Samsung Electronics set artificial crises to alert 
employees even after they gained competitive advantages. This is to put an emphasis on 
addressing new challenges that may lie ahead of them and complementing any disadvantages 
vis-à-vis their (potential) rivals, instead of compensating for what they have done well in the 
past and promising incentives to the best performances of employees. Thus firms have 
created a clear goal-setting of business and promoted a higher dedication of workers to 
achieve such goals, which have become the fundamental drive for firms’ growth and 
sustainability. 
Overall, the capabilities that are illustrated as unique to the MNCs from emerging 
economies, particularly the successful Asian firms, have gained attention as the success 
factors of the MNCs in general. As the competitive landscape has been changing rapidly, the 
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dynamic perspectives on firm capabilities have become crucial. In high velocity 
environments, learning capability (i.e., absorptive capacity) and synergy creation capability 
(i.e., combinative capability) were emphasized to adapt to changing environments within a 
limited time period (i.e., economies of speed). The motivations of workers and goal settings 
have been largely emphasized by organizational scholars to increase learning and operational 
capabilities (e.g., Taylor, 1911[1967]). Therefore, it is very interesting to note that Asian 
firms have created sustainable advantages without advanced technology and innovation, but 
with different kinds of capabilities that have gained more attention in international business.  
 
 
6. MOTIVATIONS FOR FDI 
 
With an extended view on FDI from asset exploitation to asset complementation and on 
firm-specific assets, FDI motivations can also be further extended. Dunning’s FDI 
motivations are categorized as market-seeking, resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking and 
strategic-asset seeking. However, Dunning’s motivations are mainly focused on gaining 
greater rents. By applying the concept of the diamond model (Porter, 1990; Moon, Rugman 
and Verbeke, 1998), a more rigorous analysis on firm motivation can be drawn. It is because 
firm activities are not only concerned with resource building and market expansion, but also 
with strategic reasons to enhance their competitive position and to deal with risks and 
opportunities coming from related and support industries. The FDI motivation can thus be 
categorized to four: factor-seeking, market-seeking, related and supporting sector-seeking 
and strategic business context-seeking.
2
  
First, the (input) factor-seeking FDI refers to resources, both tangible and intangible, 
which are critical for firm operations and productions. These factors can be subcategorized to 
basic and advanced factors where basic factors are related to country-specific assets such as 
natural resources and unskilled workers, while advanced factors are firm-specific assets such 
as skilled managerial capabilities and technology. This was extended from Dunning’s 
resource and strategic-asset seeking motivations. The resource seeking is renamed under the 
basic factor conditions, and strategic-asset seeking under the advanced factor conditions.  
The factor seeking can be both to exploit firm-specific resources and to complement its 
disadvantages in host countries. For example, LGE purchased a 5 per cent share of Zenith 
(US) in 1991. The investment purpose was to acquire flat screen TV and multimedia 
technologies, the brand name and access to the US market to compete in digital technology 
market. LGE increased its stake to 57.7 percent in 1995 and acquired the company in 1999 
(Moon, 2007).  
Second, the market-seeking FDI refers to market expansion, according to the 
conventional FDI perspective. However, as Porter (1990) explained, understanding the most 
sophisticated market stimulates firms to innovate and find competitive sources. In order to 
learn sophisticated tastes of consumers in diverse areas, firms strategically invest in the most 
sophisticated market of the world. For example, Amore Pacific, a Korean cosmetic company, 
invested in France in order to learn the sophisticated French cosmetic market. 
Third, the related-and-support-sector seeking FDI has become increasingly important. 
When firms invest abroad, interdependent firms follow in order to complement operations 
                                                          
2 Some of the examples of this section are abstracted and extended from Moon and Roehl (2001) and 
Moon (2007). 
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with each other in foreign locations. This type of motivation can be sub-categorized into two: 
the host country related-and-supporting sectors, or partnered firms’ related-and-supporting 
sectors. The former refers to firms choosing a certain location over others to take advantage 
of the support sectors in the host country. For example, a Korean firm, Choong-ang Plastic 
Engineering that manufactures polyester tarpaulin bag for cement products established 
manufacturing facilities in Guangdong Province of China because of the advantage coming 
from the province’s transportation and financial infrastructure. On the other hand, the latter 
refers to firm’s investment in order to support its related firms from home countries. For 
example, Wooribank, a Korean commercial bank, invested abroad to make Korean firms in 
foreign locations have an easier access to financial support. Also, as Hyundai Motors 
expanded its operations abroad, a number of part suppliers also followed the route. This type 
of follow-the-partner FDI strategy can also be found in other manufacturing and service 
industries.  
The fourth motivation of FDI is the strategic business context-seeking FDI. This FDI 
motivation is missing in the conventional FDI theory but can be understood in the context of 
business competition. For example, SEC and LGE tend to engage in similar activities in 
similar locations just for strategic purposes. This is to keep each other in check or offset the 
advantage of its competitors for going abroad.  
More recently, firms have been investing in strategic locations to portray a certain image 
of a firm’s product or to secure strategic locations. Hyundai Motors incorporated a factory in 
the US not only to serve the US market more efficiently but also to build an image that 
Hyundai cars are manufactured in the US. The preferential treatment (e.g., tax reduction) has 
also motivated firms to choose a certain location over others. Alabama’s tax incentive system 
was one of the strategic reasons for Hyundai Motors’ FDI. Strategic purposes can also be 
related to political and social pressure at home. For example PulmuOne, a Korean food 
processing company, built its business in the US to avoid various regulations on food 
processing industry enforced by the Korean government. Another Korean company, SeA 
International, established a factory in Guatemala to overcome quota restrictions imposed in 
home market.  
This categorization, while looking into external and internal, as well as direct and indirect 
factors, shows a more comprehensive yet systematic analysis of FDI motivations. We can see 
that Dunning’s definitions of resource-seeking and strategic asset-seeking FDI are under the 
categorization of the (input) factor-seeking. Efficiency-seeking, which is examined in terms 
of labor cost reduction, can also be categorized under factor-seeking. Dunning’s market-
seeking FDI is similar to the category of market-seeking, but missing the aspect of learning 
market sophistication. Thus, Dunning’s categorization is limited in scope and covers only 
two subsets of the four categories of this new framework. This categorization, extended and 
revised from Moon’s (2007) analysis, incorporates a more comprehensive and various 





This paper examined different paths of FDI and presented an extended perspective on 
what motivates firms to invest abroad. Firms invest abroad to balance out any of their 
affluence or deficiency in the system. This is because firms invest not only to exploit their 
advantages but to complement their critical disadvantages. Thus FDI motivations can be 
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extended and re-organized into four aspects, which are factor seeking, market seeking, 
related-and-support-industry seeking and (strategic) business-context seeking. This 
categorization shows an integrated picture of how firms act to complement or allocate their 
resources in the case of discrepancies in the entire value chain activities.  
This paper also contributed by bridging the gap between the OLI paradigm and the 
imbalance theory by reinterpreting ownership advantage. By linking ownership advantage 
with four success factors presented by Moon (2013; 2014), this paper emphasized different 
types of firm advantages that may be crucial for MNCs from developing countries as well as 
the leading firms in high-velocity global marketplace. 
As Darwinism theory explains the rational selection and survival of the fittest, it is not the 
strongest and the most differentiated resources that make the firms grow, but the ability to 
complement and adapt to the changing environments. Thus the logic of imbalance theory of 
the firm, together with new sources of capabilities of how to redress imbalances, can better 
explain FDI motivations and sources of firm competitiveness than the conventional theories 
of FDI. 
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